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ACCOUNTABILITY CONCEPTIONS AND
FEDERALISM TALES: DISNEY'S
WONDERFUL WORLD?
William W. Buzbee*
MARRIED TO THE MOUSE: WALT DISNEY WORLD AND ORLANDO.

By Richard E. Foglesong. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2001.
Pp. xvi, 251. $27.95.
Richard Foglesong's1 Married to the Mouse: Walt Disney World
and Orlando, may not offer the thrills of an entertainment park, but it
is an uncommonly good read. In a book focused on approximately
four decades of Disney's interactions with Orlando and state officials,
political scientist Foglesong tells the tale of how Walt Disney ended up
locating his new East Coast entertainment park in Orlando, Florida
and what happened in subsequent government-Disney company inter
actions. Using chapter headings based on stages in a personal relation
ship's progression ("Serendipity" to "Seduction" through "Marriage,"
and ultimately, after interim stages, "Therapy"), Foglesong shows that
while the relationship had its birth in a mutual desire for economic
growth, the government-Disney relationship was also dynamic and at
times unpredictable. This work is likely to influence debates on sub
jects as diverse as federalism, land use, state and local government,
public choice, deregulation and privatization of government functions.
Compared to most legal scholarship exploring these subjects, po
litical scientist Foglesong's technique is unusual. Foglesong actually
conducted substantial documentary research into the Disney-Orlando
story and interviewed many of the key players. Weaving in the fruits
of this document review and interview process, the book presents a
nuanced picture of this increasingly complex and ultimately souring
forty year relationship between an economic powerhouse and its less
sophisticated local and state government and business counterparts.
Orlando granted Disney substantial governmental authority, thus
making the company a rarity as both the predominant business in a
city and, in part, its own government. To an extent perhaps unparal* Professor of Law, Emory Law School. B.A. 1983, Amherst; J.D. 1986, Columbia. The
author of this Review thanks Will Haines and Andrea Booher for their assistance, Lisa
Chang for her support, and Richard Foglesong for sharing drafts of his book and taking time
to discuss his research. - Ed.

1. Professor of Politics, Rollins College.
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leled within the United States, Disney succeeded in controlling both
market choices and governmental issues within its approximately forty
square mile kingdom.
Whether this story of a business that transformed a sleepy Florida
city into the most popular tourist destination in the world offers
broader lessons for law and policymaking is a difficult question.
Disney's breadth, success and audacity seem beyond category. Justice
Cardozo once spoke of the "tendency of a principle to expand itself to
the limit of its logic . . . . "2 Along several different trajectories, the
Disney World Story goes well beyond usually anticipated limits.
Pushing propositions well past their usual bounds, however, may just
reveal the implications of extremity, and not the implications of, for
example, partial privatization of government functions or business ef
forts to externalize costs of new development. At times the reader
may yearn for more in-depth political science analysis, but apart from
occasional forays into related political science scholarship, Foglesong
devotes most of his attention simply to telling the Disney-Orlando
story. Like other classics on urban government and growth, such as
Caro's The Power Broker,3 this book's principal value may lie in its
rich tale as itself a source of edification, as well as for analysis by
Foglesong and others in subsequent scholarship.4 Married to the
Mouse ultimately succeeds due to the insights offered by its blend of
historically grounded observations, brief but deft placement of its own
analysis within political science literature, and a rich story of several
decades of business-government interaction and reshaping of the legal
terrain.
This Essay starts by reviewing highlights of Disney World's first
forty years, as presented in Foglesong's book and a few other recent
accounts of Disney World's growth and operations. It then turns in
Part II to closer analysis of what happens to accountability when pri
vate and public powers merge as occurred at Disney World. Part III
examines this book's methodological approach, contrasting its mode
of analysis with prevailing legal scholarship approaches to examina
tion of business-government interactions, particularly in literature on
federalism and motivations of state and local governments. The kind
of context and history-rich analysis offered by Foglesong constitutes
an approach generally missing from legal scholarship. Public law legal

2. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF TH.E JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921 ).
3. ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER (1974). Caro's monumental work is un
doubtedly substantially different in its painstaking investigation into all aspects of Robert
Moses's life, but Foglesong's work shares the willingness to look in a sustained way, with re
course to primary materials and interviews, at his subject. Both also are compelling reads.
4. Foglesong has already utilized his research in other scholarship. See Richard E.
Foglesong, Walt Disney World and Orlando: Deregulation as a Strategy for Tourism, in THE
TOURIST CITY 89-106 (Dennis R. Judd & Susan S. Fainstein eds., 1999).
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scholarship more typically focuses on legal texts or structures or, in
scholarship influenced by economic modes of analysis, often seeks to
discern the nature of business or governments at various levels based
on aggregate, modeled or statistical analyses. Married to the Mouse
offers numerous compelling examples of how politics, personalities
and historical context influenced both legal developments and the
evolving nature of government-business interactions. As generally
predicted, a broad consensus in support of economic growth led to the
enthusiastic embrace of the Disney World project, but later stages of
business-government relationship revealed a thornier interaction as
the costs of Disney's growth created burdens and dysfunction. This
book's ultimate and most valuable lesson is that people and politics
matter. Utilization of assumptions about predictable or inevitable
types of business or government actions may be unavoidable, espe
cially when designing or critiquing regulatory regimes, but such as
sumptions should be leavened with attention to historical detail and
context.
I.

THE DISNEY WORLD STORY

When Walt Disney began to search for a location in the eastern
United States for a new Disney complex to rival the West Coast
Disneyland, he and his team settled on a location. They attended a fes
tive dinner preceding planned execution of documents committing
Disney to its new venture. When the head of the city's leading busi
ness questioned Disney's business acumen in planning a tourist desti
nation that would not sell alcohol - "Any man who thinks he can de
sign an attraction that is going to be a success in this city and not serve
beer or liquor, ought to have his head examined" - Walt Disney took
umbrage (p. 2). As Foglesong recounts, Disney later that evening an
nounced that the deal was off and Disney and his team would leave in
the morning (p. 2). The loser? Not Orlando, but Saint Louis, due to
the imprudent assertiveness of August (Gussie) Busch Jr. Rather than
a revitalized and perhaps burdened Saint Louis, the Disney World
team turned its sights to other potential locations.
Several Orlando business leaders known as the "movers and shak
ers" had for years sought to create conditions that would lure business
and growth to Orlando. Their chief tool was to attract non-local fed
eral and state highway funds for roadbuilding that would make
Orlando a key transportation hub (p. 17). Led by Orlando's most im
portant power broker, Billy Dial, and newspaper publisher, Martin
Anderson, these business leaders succeeded in their efforts. With the
substantial assistance of "politically insulated institutions" such as the
State Turnpike Authority and the State Road Board (pp. 22, 23-26),
these "movers and shakers" succeeded in attracting new highway links
and expansions that passed through Orlando. Neither these local busi-
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ness and political leaders nor the state knew who or what would be at
tracted to the area, but they felt confident that with new roads, benefi
cial business growth would follow.5
Despite occasionally strong local opposition to the destruction
wrought by the new confluence of highways running through and near
Orlando, political deals and the lure of non-local funds succeeded
(pp. 27-30). By the time Walt Disney turned his eyes to Orlando, the
city offered a near perfect intersection of major, limited access high
ways that could be used by the millions of planned tourists (pp. 12,
14-15). Foglesong's Chapter Two constitutes a modest antidote to the
oft-voiced assertion in legal scholarship and court opinions that with
smaller levels of government, greater accountability and sensitivity to
local citizens' needs will be found.6 This first stage in Orlando's growth
instead presents business leaders motivated largely by profit and local
boosterism who, in turn, used state and federal money and politically
insulated state institutions to transform a city's landscape and future.
Indeed, little evidence of Disney, state or local government attention
to broader desires or views of the citizenry appears anywhere in this
story. Instead, citizens were repeatedly disenfranchised by state and
local officials who acquiesced in Disney's requests.
Once Orlando's climate, location and transportation infrastructure
were found appropriate, Disney began, through stealth and intermedi
aries, to acquire land near Orlando (pp. 34-35). Seeking to avoid the
escalation in prices and public scrutiny that would accompany public
knowledge about Disney's plans, it employed an array of people and
devices, among them false identification documents, an assortment of
newly created corporations lacking any name link to Disney, two for
mer World War II intelligence agents, and an assortment of mostly
uninformed real estate brokers. They rapidly assembled rights to sub
stantial portions of the desired 27 ,500 acre parcel (p. 49).
When Walt's brother and later Disney leader Roy Disney ques
tioned acquiring so much property for a venture that would actually
use a far smaller area, Walt offered two explanations. First, he pre
ferred for Disney to control not only Disney World's core but also the
surrounding areas. He feared the visual clutter and tackiness that al
ready surrounded the California-based Disneyland (p. 46). Walt
5. Pp. 31-32. As stated by an Orlando merchant during a 1960s road controversy,
"[t)here is no progress without inconvenience to some." P. 22.
6. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down portion of
radioactive waste disposal legislation due to its unconstitutional mandate to states either to
accept federal regulation or take title to the waste and explaining that such a mandate would
undercut accountability by blurring state government accountability for its actions); Gregory
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (stating that "a decentralized government . .. will be
more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society"); Richard Briffault, The Rise
of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 503-07 (1997) (in as
sessment of "sublocal" municipal institutions, reviewing economics and political science lit
erature anticipating local government sensitivity to citizen concerns).
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Disney also recognized the benefits of ensuring that Disney controlled
blocks of property in two local jurisdictions, Orange and Osceola
Counties. Disney would have "more bargaining power" (p. 46).
Disney was ultimately able, within eighteen months, to acquire a par
cel twice the size of Manhattan and about the same size as San
Francisco (p. 49).
Married to the Mouse then begins to change in tone and content.
Foglesong offers more removed analytical observations about how
Disney and state and local government officials interacted early in
their relationship. Later in the book he begins to focus on how rapid
growth and an overwhelmingly low wage economy created harmful ex
ternalized costs for both citizens and local and state governments.
Foglesong maintains a level tone and scholarly voice. He nowhere cre
ates the written fireworks of more colorful critics such as Carl
Hiaasen, who in his short biting essay on Disney calls for "resistance"
and refers to Disney World as "a sovereign state within a state" that
succeeded in convincing Florida legislators to �'blitheringly agree to
give the company whatever it wanted."7 Although Foglesong's un
favorable assessment of the Disney-government interactions and the
breadth of power handed to Disney becomes increasingly apparent as
the book progresses, he backs his critical views with compelling docu
mentation.
From the moment Disney acknowledged its Orlando aspirations,
the company sought favorable legal treatment: Walt Disney stated
that Disney's grand plans depended on " 'how fast the state will work
with us' " (p. 51). Walt Disney's exact plans remained vague, apart
from his revelation that the complex would exceed Disneyland in size
and would include " 'a model city, a City of Tomorrow' " (p. 51).
Much as the scale of its land acquisitions went well beyond typical
business real property investment, Disney proceeded to secure a re
markable array of extraordinary political breaks and broad assump
tion of what are typically governmental powers. Businesses, the press,
and state and local officials initially saw Disney's plans as a boon for
Orlando, predicting " 'phenomenal' " real estate growth and
" 'unparalleled economic returns' " (p. 56). Governor Haydon Bums
promised the "state's '100 percent cooperation' " (p. 56), and the leg
islature and state agencies soon delivered. The Disney company was
able to avoid 40 percent of usual sales taxes on its attractions by con
vincing state tax officials that a similar percentage of Disney World's
operations would be research, design and engineering expenses
(p. 57). To gain the benefit of lower county level taxation for agricul
tural lands, Disney ensured that cows grazed on company lands
(p. 57). The thornier and more innovative Disney plan was to establish
7. CARL HIAASEN, TEAM RODENT: How DISNEY DEVOURS THE WORLD 6, 26-27
(1998).
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an autonomous political district that would be recognized by the state,
be protected from unwanted changes in the legal landscape, and be
largely immune from typical county government powers over building
and land use, police, fire and waste treatment.
Disney's desire for a private government was motivated in part by
the goal of avoiding the creation of unsightly outside development,
such as had occurred around Disneyland in California. Walt Disney
also had an abiding personal interest in effective urban planning
(pp. 59-60), perhaps rooted in his father's work as a carpenter at the
White City at the 1893 Chicago World's Fair.8 The Disney planners,
however, had their work cut out for them in efforts to convert the
scrub tree and swampy land that would eventually become Disney
World. In this period before congressional amendments created the
substantially more rigorous federal Clean Water Act, with its section
404 "dredge and fill" constraints on wetlands destruction, Walt Disney
and his minions simply saw a swamp problem requiring an engineering
cure.9 Not only did Walt Disney himself seek drainage and filling of
thousands of acres of wetland, but he also wanted to be sure the black
swamp waters would be converted to a bluish color. "Can you change
it?" he asked his engineering consultant. When told it was possible if
he "ha[d] the money," Disney said "do it" (p. 60).
The swamp conversion required more than just control of Disney's
swamps and creative engineers. Disney needed either a pliant and re
liable local government or governmental control for itself. Adjacent
bodies of land and water were linked. Based on its engineers' advice,
the Disney company used existing state law to obtain recognition of
The Reedy Creek Drainage District. Such a district required mere ap
proval of a circuit court rather than a legislative body, would be sub
stantially immune from county government interference, and would be
governed based not on numbers of residents, but on numbers of acres
controlled (p. 61).
But the Disney officials needed more than mere drainage auton
omy. To secure additional immunities from local or state government
oversight and increase protection of their substantial investment in
Orlando, the Disney company sought and received advice from con
sultants to find ways to be " 'freed from the impediments to change,

8. Foglesong has in another major work on urban design and governance described the
White City, designed by Frederick Law Olmstead of Central Park fame and Daniel
Burnham, as part of a larger exploration of urban form within a capitalist market system. See
RICHARD E. FOGLESONG, PLANNING THE CAPITALIST CITY: THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE
1920s 124-66 (1986).
9. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994) (setting forth substantive and procedural provisions lim
iting permits for placing "dredged or fill material" into navigable waters).

1296

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:1290

such as rigid building codes, traditional property rights, and elected
political officials.' "10
Acting on this advice, Disney officials advocated the chartering of
two new municipalities, one of which would be experimental in its de
sign and modes of governance. As envisioned, it would be an Experi
mental Prototype Community of Tomorrow, or "EPCOT." This ex
perimental municipality as originally conceived would lack landowners
and therefore also lack voter control (p. 65). Around this time, Walt
Disney succumbed to lung cancer, but the planning continued. When
the Disney company officially presented its state legislative proposals
with a more fleshed out EPCOT vision, Walt Disney was on hand,
through a previously recorded film, to describe this experimental city
(pp. 66-68). In this often rebroadcast film, Walt Disney described a
variant on a new urbanist vision, this time complete with actual resi
dents, coordinated design and minimal reliance on the automobile.
This early EPCOT vision was substantially different from the com
mercially underwritten portion of the Disney World theme park that,
with an international theme, was later built and also referred to as
EPCOT.
Disney and its advisors disseminated three proposed pieces of state
legislation to create Disney's own self governance through the spe
cially chartered Reedy Creek Improvement District. Although a few
legislators expressed doubts about the breadth of governmental pow
ers and immunities granted to Disney, they were reassured by Disney
representatives. The bills' actual terms, however, gave Disney substan
tial immunity from state and local regulation. These bills even sought
to make these protections unusually durable with language requiring
later explicit repeal of these new town charters before they could be
subjected to new or different legal constraints (p. 71). These bills, col
lectively referred to as the Reedy Creek charter and creating the
Reedy Creek Improvement District, were passed largely as proposed
by Disney after twelve days of debate (pp. 72-73). Some legislators
who supported these bills later rued them as "one of the worst things
that ever happened," because they "gave [Disney] too many pow
ers. "11 The Florida Supreme Court further enhanced Disney's gov
ernmental powers when it agreed that the Reedy Creek Improvement
District could issue tax-free municipal bonds, thus enabling Disney's
new government arm to finance infrastructure with bonds partially
underwritten by federal taxpayers.
10. Pp. 62, 230 nn.20-24 (quoting REPORT FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
TO WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS, EXPERIMENTAL PROTOTYPE CITY OF TOMORROW:
OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION TO DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
20-22 (Aug. 15, 1966) (on file with the Disney Archives)).
11. P. 73 (quoting Henry Land, a legislator who chaired the House Appropriations
Committee). Land also stated that had he stood up in opposition, "[he] would have been
lynched." P. 73.
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Despite repeated planning stage references to a substantial future
Disney World including a residential community, Disney avoided a
citizen population for roughly three decades (pp. 70, 72 and 75).
Disney instead built an entertainment complex that involved only
tourists and a few temporary or Disney-affiliated residents (p. 75). Un
til the much later building of the retro-styled Celebration community
in the 1990s, Disney remained largely unconstrained by the potentially
unruly presence of resident citizens. As observed by novelist Hiaasen,
"control has been the signature ingredient of all the company's phe
nomenally successful theme parks. "12 Even in Celebration, residents
refer to Disney's influence as that of a "benevolent dictator."13
Unshackled from the constraints of a local government land use
review process or building code, the Disney company quickly started
and in four years completed its massive building project. Water was
drained, canals built, sludge removed, and the theme park's central
areas raised twelve feet above the surrounding land. Disney, however,
did not shirk in the quality of its construction. It created its own
building code that included features, such as smoke monitors, alarms
and fire sprinklers, that were then lacking in most municipal codes
(p. 81 ). Innovations such as underground pneumatic waste removal
were also created after Disney encouraged technology companies to
experiment with new ideas at Disney World (pp. 82-83). With such
control, Disney was able to create a coordinated and cohesive design
for its theme park.
Disney's growth both paralleled and contributed to rapid growth in
the Orlando area. Due to Disney's control of market and government
decisions within its now state-sanctioned borders, Disney was able to
coordinate its actions. Local governments, however, rapidly found that
small city modes of governance were ill matched for a rapidly growing
region (pp. 92-94). Sporadic efforts by area businesses and officials to
ensure that growth and necessary public services were adequately co
ordinated met with failure. Governmental powers and private market
goals were joined only within Disney's borders. Quickly, the sur
rounding roads and communities were confronted with poorly coordi
nated and often dispersed modes of growth.14 Surrounding private
ventures that sought to divert Disney tourists and compete with
Disney's attractions and on-site hotels were economically disadvan
taged due to Disney's local tax breaks and unusual ability to use tax
free municipal bonds for infrastructure development (p. 94). Due to
12. HIAASEN, supra note 7, at 69.
13. ANDREW Ross, THE CELEBRATION CHRONICLES: LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE
PURSUIT OF PROPERTY VALUE IN DISNEY'S NEW TOWN 230 (1999).
14. Orlando's rapid growth and attendant discomforts track those commonly found in
sprawling metropolitan areas. See generally William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism,
and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 63-76 (1999).
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the absence of independent resident voting citizens in Disney's two
state-recognized towns, Disney's growing and usually low wage work
force had to turn to other municipalities for schools, housing and other
public services. These costs of growth were thus successfully foisted on
other municipalities, the state, or the federal government.
Not until the mid-1970s did Disney propose a substantial expan
sion of its theme park. Called "EPCOT,'' this internationally themed
series of exhibits bore virtually no resemblance to the residential
model community that had previously been referred to by the same
name. By this time, the costs of further growth of Disney and sur
rounding businesses were already apparent. Local and state officials
began to show modest resistance to Disney's plans. Several state offi
cials thought this expansion should be subjected to analysis as a "de
velopment of regional impact,'' as was now generally required under a
1972 state law intended to rationalize regional growth (p. 101 ). The
state Attorney General, however, sided with Disney arguments that
the original Reedy Creek charter protected Disney from obligations to
comply with this subsequently passed state law.15 Disney thus was able
to expand without sharing regional planning burdens. As Disney ex
panded, many other surrounding attractions foundered, unable to
compete successfully with Disney's subsidized and unfettered opera
tions, as well as Disney's popularity, smooth running and attractive fa
cilities (pp. 103-05).
By the mid-1980s, the vast internationalized Disney company was
struggling due to cost overruns at Disney World and poor movie reve
nues. To capture more of the Disney World revenues, Disney again
began to expand, this time with new hotel construction to keep tourist
revenues on site. Increasing the density of tourist use on the Reedy
Creek lands, however, also meant increased infrastructure burdens
and road congestion. Disney resisted paying for road improvements
and opposed transportation proposals such as a light rail system
(pp. 109-1 1 ). Such a rail system could have eased transportation ills
and facilitated tourist movement from the Orlando airport to Disney,
but it would also have facilitated tourist decisions to stay off site and
15. This Disney-drafted legislation did, in fact, attempt to provide Disney with a poten
tially perpetual break from other regulatory obligations on the Reedy Creek lands. Section
23(1) of the charter stated that the "jurisdiction and powers of the Board of Supervisors [of
the Reedy Creek Improvement District] provided for herein shall be exclusive of any law
now or hereafter enacted providing for land use regulation, zoning or building codes, by the
State of Florida or any agency or authority of the state and the provisions of any such law
shall not be applicable within the territorial limits of the District." P. 102 (emphasis added).
Although this later regional planning and impact analysis law called for analysis of an ac
tion's regional effects, and hence did not focus on, for example, on-site impacts of the
EPCOT construction, Attorney General Shevins read the law broadly to exempt Disney.
The net effect was to burden competitors' major projects with obligations under this regional
planning law, including mitigation obligations, while Disney was subjected to no such similar
burdens and costs.
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utilize non-Disney restaurants and entertainment. Hints of Disney
support for light and magnetic rail service did not mature into public
Disney support, leading interested business leaders and area officials
to feel betrayed (pp. 122-31).
Around this time, the Orlando-Disney honeymoon began to end,
with critical newspaper coverage assailing Disney's failure to assist
with public needs, Disney's aloof manner, and the off-site impacts of
Disney's substantial expansion plans (pp. 1 11-13). Despite belated
Disney efforts to smooth relations with local officials, irked competi
tors and local officials began to pursue means to undercut Disney's
privileged legal status, including a challenge to the constitutionality of
the Reedy Creek Charter. That challenge was ultimately dropped af
ter a settlement was reached committing Disney to pay a small portion
of infrastructure expenses associated with Disney expansions.16 When
Osceola County tax officials decided to start taxing largely undevel
oped Disney land at a rate reflecting its "highest and best use," Disney
fought to keep its privileged low tax rate status and ultimately secured
a settlement largely splitting the difference (pp. 146-50).
Foglesong's book gives limited and somewhat superficial attention
to Disney's use of a private police force that sometimes acted as
though an arm of the state, but there too Disney only reluctantly con
ceded ground by distinguishing the appearance of its security person
nel from that used by county and state police (pp. 137-45). During this
"negotiation" period, as labeled by Foglesong, state and local govern
ments began to impose on Disney obligations to pay for costs associ
ated with its growth, but Disney also continued strategically to use tax
breaks, bonding authority and negotiation over allocation of costs as
sociated with growth to minimize these burdens (pp. 150-58). Despite
Disney's irrevocable commitment to its location and huge sunk costs
in Disney World, the company still fared quite well in securing gov
ernment assistance and favored treatment. Local officials became per
sonally acquainted with their Disney counterparts and expected
neighborly behavior that often failed to materialize (pp. 172-79).
The story of Disney's belated inclusion of a residential component,
Celebration, within the Reedy Creek charter lands has been exten
sively told by others, so Foglesong wisely focuses on the Celebration
project as another locus of Disney-government negotiation and strate
gic behavior.17 Here too, a familiar pattern is found. Disney structured
the creation and nature of Celebration so this first infusion of poten16. Pp. 117-20. Disney's success in securing most of the limited available tax exempt
housing bond capacity for sewage infrastructure resulted from Disney's circumvention of the
traditional coordination of such requests through county officials. Furious county officials
unsuccessfully pursued potential legislative cures or a litigation option, but were unsuccess
ful. Pp. 131-37.
17. See, e.g. , Ross, supra note 13.
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tially independent actual voting citizens would not imperil Disney
World's governance by corporate control. It therefore de-annexed
Celebration from Reedy Creek, accepting as the price of this decision
subjecting Celebration to new state growth management legislation
(pp. 150-53). Disney still sought to impose these costs on others, with
some success, and also notably succeeded in building no low income or
affordable housing in its new town. Few Disney World employees
could afford Celebration housing, yet Disney ultimately negotiated to
an agreement discharging its obligation to underwrite housing needs
with a mere $100,000 per year, three year commitment (pp. 160-61).
Disney even found means to blunt the power of Celebration's new
resident citizens, creating a community development district board
elected on the basis of acres owned. As the largest property owner,
Disney controlled this board. Detailed covenants controlling resident
behavior and house aesthetics were administered by residential and
commercial owners' associations, further minimizing risks of loss of
control over this new venture.18 Even these associations were con
strained due to Disney's retention of veto power (p. 164). Celebration
residents also grew disenchanted at times, especially when Disney's
apparent commitment to a model public school proved illusory
(pp. 166-71).
Foglesong concludes by stepping back from his chronological story
to summarize the less salutary aspects of Disney World's growth. Due
to its size, Disney has consistently generated huge tax revenues for the
state and local governments; indeed, Disney remains Orange County's
largest taxpayer (p. 180). Disney's favored tax status, however, sub
jected surrounding counties to unreimbursed public expenses while
competitors were monetarily disadvantaged. The company's over
whelmingly low wage workforce created unmet needs for affordable
housing and social services. Disney's presence and the concentration
of tourists also attracted a huge number of similar low wage enter
tainment ventures to nearby areas. Orlando's economy thus was heav
ily weighted not to high wage ventures, but to a low wage entertain
ment service industry. All of this growth created transportation and
congestion problems, and Disney's huge market clout and zealous pro
tection of its tourist-generated revenues also undercut the economic
viability of Orlando's old downtown.
In a closing essay placing the Disney World story in the context of
other political science scholarship, Foglesong inquires why local and
state government officials would continue giving Disney special treat
ment long after the initial rapture of attracting Disney had faded.19
18. See id. at 223-36.
19. Foglesong in this closing section offers a detailed recounting of how Disney suc
ceeded in having built at mostly public expense a costly new highway interchange. County
acceptance of this obligation followed confusing and questionable claims about the county
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Foglesong suggests that "regime politics" political scientists offer a
partial explanation in their focus on particular personal and institu
tional relationships.20 These multiple "institutional, political, and cul
tural rather than economic" ties set a municipality into predictable
behavioral patterns that constitute a form of "path dependence" that,
in the case of Disney World, "limit[ed] Orlando's choices about its
economic development" (p. 194). A "large-scale, extended public
dialogue" about issues such as public and private values, overcom
mitment to a single employer or industry, and excessive grants of pub
lic power to a private entity, suggests Foglesong, would have the po
tential to "transform this one-sided economic development marriage"
(p. 200). How this debate would actually come about, however, is left
largely unaddressed except when Foglesong suggests that "political
entrepreneurs" might be able to seize on Disney-created ills to foster
such a public discussion (pp. 198-99).
II.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND EXTERNALITIES WHEN THE PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC MERGE

The Disney World story presents elements both consistent and in
consistent with scholarly expectations. As predicted in Paul Peterson's
foundational City L imits,21 state and local governments fell all over
themselves for Disney and explicitly sought growth and conditions
suitable for new investment with its attendant employment, real estate
and tax benefits. Foglesong focuses on many of the negative side ef
fects of Disney World, but Orlando's pro-growth consensus succeeded
to an extent surely envied by the many struggling cities in the United
States. Orlando attracted a huge employer, a generator of massive tax
revenues, and a world-famous attraction. Many parents with tired feet
might vacillate on whether Disney World is a good thing, as surely
would environmentalists valuing wetlands,22 but many millions of free
spending tourists apparently view Disney World as a worthwhile fam
ily investment.23
location of this interchange. He includes interviews with key officials to discern why gov
ernment generosity to Disney continued long after Disney was locked into Orlando and
many of the costs of Disney's phenomenal growth had become apparent. Pp. 185, 188-91.
Foglesong concludes that multiple personal relationships among business and government
leaders led local officials to continue their generosity to Disney. Pp. 94-95.
20. See CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME POLITICS: GOVERNING ATLANTA, 1946-88
(1989); THE POLITICS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT (Clarence N. Stone & Heywood T.
Sanders eds., 1987).
21. PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981).
22. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and Commodification of Environmental
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 648-65 (2000) (discussing difficulty in commodifying complex

services and values of environmental amenities such as wetlands).
23. It has also inspired masterful satires such as Carl Hiaasen's NATIVE TONGUE (1991),
a skewering of a seedier variant on Disney and other pervasive forms of Florida excess.
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The Disney World story, however, is far less consistent with opti
mistic expectations about state and local government sensitivity to
citizens' desires and needs. Citizens are all but missing from state, lo
cal government, or Disney considerations and activities. With malle
able and acquiescent state and local officials rolling out the carpet,
Disney instead repeatedly sought and obtained authority to bypass
citizen control or even modest democratic accountability, avoid its fair
share of growth burdens, and shift to others many societal discomforts
associated with its kingdom. The state capitulated to Disney's desires,
giving Disney many of the powers of government, but with no explicit
requirement that the company answer to resident citizens.24 The
merger in Disney World of private and governmental control over an
over forty square mile district shows both the benefits of internaliza
tion of all private and public functions, but also the likely inevitability
of efforts to shift costs to others. The breadth of the Disney World
Reedy charter district did not render Disney immune from running
roughshod over public concerns when they conflicted with the profit
motive. As an experiment in the merger of private and public powers,
Disney World constitutes a mostly cautionary tale.
The benefits of merging public and private powers are mostly evi
dent in the planning and building of Disney World. Disney was able to
carry out its massive infrastructure and building effort in rapid fashion,
also using its flexibility in building code design to embrace and test in
novative techniques. As scholars of regulation often assert, reducing
constraining regulations facilitated private sector innovation.25
Disney's efficient initial efforts are also consistent with arguments
voiced in favor of privatization of government functions.26 Disney
showed vision in creating a coherent and coordinated Disney World
design, converting a largely swamp environment into a highly engi
neered and fully conceived entertainment powerhouse. A critic for
24. Economist William Fischel suggests that homeowners' interest in protecting the val
ues of their homes leads local governments to be sensitive to citizen desires, including citizen
interest in amenities such as environmental protection. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME vALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001). By circumventing resident
political voice for over three decades, Disney World avoided what Fischel sees as the key
determinant of responsiveness to the citizenry.
25. For a discussion of regulatory reform efforts and the relationship of regulatory bur
dens, innovation and regulatory design, see THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING
RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
1-6 (1991).
26. See generally Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized
Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569 (2001) (in critique of welfare privatization efforts, reviewing

arguments for and against privatization and noting advocates' claims about efficiency and
innovation); Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The
Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878 (1990) (in critique of shift of low income
housing provision from government to private sector, reviewing efficiency claims but also
noting prevalent risk of market failure).
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New York magazine suggested that Disney World and its West Coast
sibling, Disneyland, were the only new towns of architectural signifi
cance built in the United States since World War Il.27
Disney designers credited their building and design success to their
unusual ability to control all aspects of their environment: "We were
very careful to avoid any contradictions in architecture and design . . . .
The challenge was not just in the theme park this time but outside the
park because for this project we had total control . . . we owned all the
immediate surrounding land."28 Disney World and the later
Celebration development thus in some respects resembled, on a much
larger scale, modest-sized new urbanist developments such as Seaside,
Florida.29 Seaside's planners and Disney mandated a coordinated aes
thetic and centrally planned design within an area initially owned by
one developer. In both settings, the result was a degree of harmony
and functional mixed uses often lacking in multiple owner, market
driven urban and suburban developments. Even hyperbolic critic Carl
Hiaasen notes the "wave of relief that overwhelms you upon entering
[Disney World] - relief to be free of the nerve-shattering traffic and
the endless ugly sprawl. " 03
Despite this merging of private and government control, the
Disney World story also reveals massive environmental destruction
and substantial exportation of the negative externalities. Disney's un
usual power to control and coordinate, as well as easy ability of citi
zens and local and state governments to attribute credit and blame to
Disney, did not lead to Disney accountability or acceptance of respon
sibility. Disney's socially unconcerned behavior and despoliation of
the environment is in tension with more optimistic views of reliance on
private market incentives or state and local government regulators.
For example, "free market" oriented critics of current environmental
frameworks suggest that with improved property rights and ability to
trace responsibility for environmental harms, producers of goods and
bads such as pollution will be subjected to market or common law dis
cipline and clean up their act.31 Instead, in the absence of later-enacted
stringent federal wetlands protection laws, Disney filled swamps, re
routed areas with flowing water and imported sand to change Disney
27. P. 84 (citing and quoting from Peter Blake, Mickey Mouse for Mayor?, NEW YORK
MAG., Feb. 7, 1972, at 41).
28. P. 84 (quoting Press release, Walt Disney Productions, The First 20 Years . . . from
Disneyland to Walt Disney World (1976)).
29. For discussion of new urbanist design, Seaside, and typical sprawling development
today, see ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000). For discussion of the roots of sprawl and bar
riers to achieving the new urbanist vision on a larger scale, see Buzbee, supra note 14.
30. HIAASEN, supra note 7, at 5.
31. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET
ENVIRONMENTALISM (rev. ed. 2001).
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World's once murky waters to blue.32 Regardless of larger values or
services of wetlands, Disney showed no compunction about the con
version of a complex ecosystem into an environmentally manipulated
theme park. The profit motive overwhelmed ecosystem values not
able to be captured by Disney in the market.
Similarly, Disney's employment of a massive low-wage workforce
created vast housing and social service needs, yet Disney played the
political system to avoid paying its share for local burdens. Despite
new state laws requiring growth proponents to pay impact fees for
growth burdens, Disney resisted such a burden with its earlier Reedy
Creek Charter immunity from new legal constraints. Disney similarly
managed to avoid paying for most road improvements needed to
service Disney World and killed with its opposition proposals for
adding passenger rail service to the Orlando area. Disney's success in
exporting to others the costs associated with its complex continued
even after local disenchantment with Disney became evident.
Disney's broad private and governmental powers produced little
evidence in Disney officials of civic engagement or expanded social
conscience. Author Foglesong at times appears to expect such social
engagement, but the reasons for such an expectation are hard to find.33
Disney, like most powerful private or public actors, preferred to avoid
public accountability and expenditures of money.34 Despite its assump
tion of broad public powers, Disney remained in the end a for-profit
corporation. After initially resisting involvement with community
projects, it eventually invested modest sums in local philanthropy, en
gendering good will within the community.35 Disney was invested with
broad government powers, but those grants of government power
were subject to no citizen check within the Disney World kingdom,
and surrounding local and state officials repeatedly showed little
stomach for taking on "the Mouse." Foglesong soundly questions the
desirability of giving an entity like Disney the ability to be "selectively
public" (p. 124).
In regulatory federalism debates, scholars often suggest that con
trol of societal ills such as environmental harm should be allocated to
32. See HIAASEN, supra note 7, at 18.
33. In recounting Disney's belated rejection of a proposed "Mag-lev" train that would
have reduced transportation woes, but also would have freed tourists to visit non-Disney
attractions, Foglesong asks: "This plan raised the question of what they were: a community
player befitting their public powers, or just another for-profit corporation." P. 124. He criti
cizes Disney's "ability to be selectively public" P. 124.
34. See, e.g., David E. Rosenbaum, When Government Doesn't Tell, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2002, § 4, at 1 (discussing how the administration of President Bush has sought to keep many

materials secret from the public).
35. Pp. 181-82. Foglesong notes, however, that Disney steadfastly resisted entreaties for
support of efforts to revitalize downtown Orlando, apparently due to downtown's status as a
potential competitor. Pp. 186-87.
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the level of government most coextensive with the scale of that harm.
Professors Butler and Macey have referred to this idea, rooted in a
few pathbreaking law and economics works, as "the matching princi
ple."36 Disney World is about as close as one could imagine to a juris
diction merging private and governmental control over an area the
size of a major American city. Its governmental powers, however, con
cededly involved a bizarre form of local governance that included self
regulation but lacked citizens for thirty years. It is thus difficult to al
locate responsibility for Disney's environmental and social oblivious
ness. Nevertheless, in the eagerness to· attract growth, state officials
actually abdicated most governmental powers to Disney and contin
ued to provide Disney substantial favored treatment long after Disney
was "married" to Orlando. State and local governments' desire for
growth, institutional and personal links to Disney, and adept political
maneuvering by Disney resulted in the near absence of governmental
correction of Disney externalities, even those ills borne outside Disney
World's borders. At a minimum, the Disney tale counsels caution in
accepting the "matching principle" as a rational for expecting more
sensitive state and local regulation of societal ills. A fairer take, how
ever, may just be one that politiq1l-economists Charles Lindblom or
Albert Hirschman would embrace.37 Both in markets and in politics,
responsive mechanisms are needed. A government without citizen
vote, voice or opportunity to exit, may be doomed to ignore citizen so
cial concerns and harms in favor of purely monetary reward.
Foglesong finds state and local officials' ongoing willingness to un
derwrite costs of Disney's growth surprising and contrary to Peterson's
"growth machine" hypothesis that focuses on economic bargaining.
Foglesong's suggestion that reduced local willingness to coddle Disney
might have been expected is supported by international development
literature. This literature suggests that as a bargain made to lure for
eign investors to engage in natural resource extraction ages, this "ob
solescing bargain" will likely result in increasingly antagonistic rela
tions and efforts to renegotiate original investment terms to favor the

36. See HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1996); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and
the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14
YALE L. & POL'Y REV.IYALE J. ON REG. 23 (Symposium Issue 1996) [hereinafter Butler &
Macey, Externalities). They, in turn, build on classic works such as Charles M. Tiebout, A
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) and further related works
such as Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout, & Robert Warren, The Organization of Gov
ernment in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, in PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN
PoLmcs (Jay S. Goodman ed., 1970).
37. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE I N FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970); CHARLES E. LINDBLOM,
POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977).
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host government.38 Foglesong hypothesizes that more than economic
concerns drove ongoing generosity towards Disney. He finds that in
stitutional and personal ties emphasized by "regime politics" political
scientists likely explain this apparently economically unnecessary be
havior (pp. 187-92). Foglesong marshals ample documentary and in
terview evidence to support his hypothesis.
One wonders, however, if in his focus on Disney-government in
teractions, Foglesong may underplay the multiplicity of interest groups
likely seeking favorable government treatment. He concedes that po
tential future investors would likely note increasingly adversarial rela
tions with earlier major investors.39 Relatedly, local and state govern
ment willingness to fund transportation links necessitated by Disney
may appear difficult to fathom, but highway construction lobbies, in
stitutions underwriting the bonds, and citizens suffering from conges
tion all stood to benefit. Thus, politicians needing to please these in
terest groups and citizens, as well as needing to show actual
accomplishments, probably saw improved infrastructure as a political
boon even if not essential to keep Disney in Orlando.Certainly many
states continue to invest in highways even where societal benefits are
difficult to find.40 A reflexive belief in the political and perhaps socie
tal benefits of economic growth goals appears to remain a prime moti
vator even as growth's discomforts become apparent.
Paradoxically, Disney's inward focus, ·obsession with control, and
lack of concern with external societal ills and costs it helped create re
semble Robert Heilbroner's critique of the Soviet Union's dysfunc
tions. In a 1990 New Yorker article, Heilbroner discussed the limited
competence of overly centralized planning.41 He noted as well that
devastation of the natural environment was a pervasive problem in the
Soviet Union, while still posing an ongoing challenge in capitalist de
mocracies.The fate of the Soviet Union and Disney World are obvi
ously in no way joined: one "devours the world," as Hiaasen says of
Disney, while the Soviet Union is now splintered into many struggling
republics. Still, this combination of forceful central control and mini
mal concern for off-ledger harms are notable similarities for a paragon
of capitalism and quintessential communist state to share.42 The overly
38. For discussion of the "obsolescing bargain" literature, see THEODORE H. MORAN,
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 141-45 (1998).
39. P. 188; MORAN, supra note 38 at 142-44 (suggesting that when developing nations
seek to renegotiate original investment bargains, they "hurt themselves" by undercutting
credibility in development bargain commitments).
40. See Buzbee, supra note 14, at 79-84 (discussing interest group pressures to build
highways that in turn facilitate sprawl).
41. Robert Heilbroner, Reflections (After Communism), NEW YORKER, Sept. 10, 1990
at 91, 99-100.
42. Repression of dissenting voices may be a further similarity. According to a recent
newspaper article, when author Foglesong was about to appear on the "Today" show to dis-
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complete merger of the private and the public may simply be a bad
combination, whether starting with a government seizure of market
functions or a private sector behemoth's successful grab for govern
ment: power. A separation of functions, with a critical distance be
tween the regulator and regulated, perhaps would have led Disney and
Orlando to a more socially beneficial state of affairs.
III.

GOVERNMENT CHARACTER IN DYNAMIC SETTINGS

What can legal scholars make of . Foglesong's examination of
Disney-Orlando interactions? Fitting this kind of historically detailed
tale into contemporary legal scholarship debates is a challenge.43 This
tale is not set within an economics influenced model of private sector,
local, state or feqeral behavior, as tends to be the focus of much envi
ronmental federalism scholarship in recent years.44 It also is not fo
cused on legal t�xts, especially the Constitution, and what the
Constitution tells us about how governmental power can or should be
allocated.45 It also is unlike much political scholarship that in recent
years is deeply into modeling of voter and government behavior. One
prominent strain in all of these bodies of scholarship seeks to analyze
what allocation of government powers will best ensure that govern
ments act in the public interest and are responsive to citizen needs.
Assessment of what actually happens in implementation, and why,
however, tends to be neglected.46 Married to the Mouse, in contrast,
cuss his book, he was pulled off the show. Earlier, a Disney executive complained to a uni
versity that had hosted a Foglesong discussion of his research. See Hank Stuever, America
Loves to Hate the Mouse, WASH. POST, Dec. 5; 2001, at Cl.
43. See Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829,
835, 855-59 (2001) (in reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000), noting the dearth of attention to his

torical context in legal scholarship and suggesting the benefits of such attention).

44. See, e.g., Butler & Macey, Externalities, supra note 36; Richard L. Revesz, Federal
ism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553
(2001).
45. See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A · DIALOGUE (1995); Robert A.
Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional
Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656 (2000). See generally Symposium, Constructing a New Feder
alism: Judicial Competence and Competition, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV./YALE J. ON REG 1
(Symposium Issue 1996) (paper symposium with an array of articles on regulatory federal
ism).
.

46. In the administrative law setting, the now defunct Administrative Conference of the
United States ("ACUS") provided support for comparable detailed analyses of how federal
agencies fulfilled their functions. For a few notable works of legal scholarship that explore
law implementation history, going well beyond written law or theoretical expectations, see,
for example, JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAy
ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOT<)R VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION,
1940-75 (1977) (describing and analyzing state, federal and industry interactions in control
ling automobile pollution); JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES
AND HARD CHOICES (1995) (analyzing U.S. EPA's enforcement practices and trends over
·
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presents a rich picture of state and local government interaction with a
dominant investor, presented over four decades. Concededly, inter
views may reveal only what stakeholders in the Disney-Orlando rela
tionship recall or wish to be remembered, and historical documents
similarly can only reveal a slice .of what happened and why. Never
theless, this tale and, in particular, its mode of investigation and analy
sis, offer several insights for legal scholars.
Mere analysis of Florida's statutes and regulations would have re
vealed a state that was slightly ahead of the curve in dealing with re
gional growth problems and the environment. How state officials ac
tually implemented their laws, however, was quite different. In reality,
Florida officials quickly capitulated to Disney requests in handing over
accountable government authority, largely eliminating citizen voice,
and in only minimally burdening Disney with a fraction of the regional
growth costs associated with Disney expansions. The written law
sounded promising, but the implemented law was far different. This
contrast between written law or theoretically based expectations has
similarly been prominent in debates over the "race to the bottom" and
environmental regulation. Theory might lead one to expect officials
trading off amenities to maximize public welfare, but empirical studies
reveal state and local officials ready to sacrifice environmental protec
tion to attract investment.47 More recent analyses of regulatory rigor
and innovation present a more complicated picture, but the imple
mented reality remains largely unexamined.48 For an example closer to

its first twenty-five years); and Thomas 0. McGarity, Deflecting the Assault: How EPA Sur
vived a "Disorganized Revolution" by "Reinventing" Itself a Bit, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11249

(Nov. 2001) (describing efforts to impose by statute cost-benefit analysis on agencies and
congressional and U.S. EPA responses to this effort). "Regime politics" scholar Clarence
Stone suggests that efforts to separate government policymaking and implementation are a
mistake. Clarence N. Stone, The Study of the Politics of Urban Development, in THE
POLffiCS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT 4-5 (Clarence N. Stone & Heywood T. Sanders eds.,
1987).
47. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race
to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210,
1233 (1992) (stating there is no support for the claim that "without federal intervention,
there will be a race to the bottom over environmental standards"). For a sampling of the
criticisms of the theoretical, empirical, and normative observations and implications of
Revesz's influential article, see Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: ls
There a "Race" and Is it "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (challenging
Revesz's conclusion with data indicating frequent state laxity); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996) (concluding that the appropriate
level of government intervention will vary based on the situation); Peter P. Swire, The Race
to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdic
tions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV./Y ALE J. ON REG. 67, 91-94 (Sympo

sium Issue 1996) (analyzing reasons why states might frequently fail to protect the environ
ment). For a response, see Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 545-63 (1997).
48. See Revesz, supra note 44, at 578-630 (compiling many citations and anecdotes con
cerning state environmental leadership and innovation, but providing little analysis of his-
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the current home of this Review Essay's author, the state of Georgia
has on the books environmental laws and regional growth measures
that appear exemplary. The actual implementation and enforcement
track record, however, reveals an often lax regulatory climate.49
Married to the Mouse also suggests that in analyzing government
industry interaction, one should not assume a static relationship.
Orlando and Disney initially shared growth aspirations, but as the
decades passed and the costs of rapid growth became more apparent,
the cozy Orlando-Disney relationship became more adversarial. A
snapshot view of Orlando, state of Florida and Disney interactions to
day might indicate a moderately rigorous regulatory climate, while ex
amination of the 1960s interactions reveals near absolute government
capitulation to Disney desires. This relationship changed as Disney's
investments and growth changed the political and economic underpin
nings of Orlando and the larger region. This book reveals no persis
tent state or local government character, but changing goals, alliances
and compromises, albeit with a sustained but eventually abating inter
est in economic growth.
It is hazardous to draw· conclusions about government-industry in
teractions based on one in-depth longitudinal study, but a few modest
inferences can likely be drawn. If government-industry interactions
are dynamic, even at the state and local level where growth goals are
likely greatest, then rigid recommendations about optimal allocations
of government authority to local, state and federal officials would be a
mistake. Dynamic industry-government interactions, if they are the
norm, mean that effective regulation will at different times depend on
different power allocations. If the political sphere and regulatory cli
mate change over time, as· they did in the setting of Florida, Orlando,
and Disney, as well as in federal-state interactions in hot-button areas
like environmental law, then judicially enforced static conceptions of
what the federal government, states or local governments can or
should do is a mistake.50 Relatedly, cooperative federalism regimes
torical circumstances leading to such laws or the implemented reality at the state and local
level).
49. See, e.g., Altamaha Riverkeepers v. City of Cochran, 162 F. Supp.2d 1368 (M.D. Ga.
2001) (discussing state of Georgia's lax enforcement practices in concluding that citizen suits
could proceed against polluters due to lack of "diligent prosecution" by state); Culbertson v.
Coats American, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (same); JAMES HOWARD
KUNSTLER, THE CITY IN MIND: MEDIATIONS ON THE URBAN CONDITION 41-75 (2001)
(tracing Georgia and Atlanta's failure to stem dysfunctional patterns of growth and trans
portation despite late 1990s legislation giving the governor broad powers to address sprawl
and transportation harms).
50. See Bandes, supra note 43, at 873-78 (criticizing judicial enforcement of static con
ception of state and federal roles); William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Feder
alism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 27-46
(1997) (analyzing how federal leadership as environmental regulatory "first mover" influ
enced allocation of federal and state roles and over time created conditions for state assump
tion of increased regulatory authority).
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that allow federal and state governments to adjust implementation and
enforcement duties depending on political will and regulatory capacity
are likely a sound idea.
This rich, four decade story of Florida, Orlando and Disney could
be viewed as a somewhat sordid picture. Public choice scholars apply
ing their skeptical wares equally to all of the players and actions in this
book would find many confirmations of jaded versions of rational ac
tor theory.51 The "law" was not a static baseline guiding private and
public conduct. Instead, Disney achieved wholesale changes in the
law, playing the state and local governments to extract benefits for it
self, while politicians generally went along with most of what Disney
sought. The state rationally allowed Disney tax-free municipal bond
ing authority, thereby successfully exporting to federal taxpayers many
of the infrastructure costs that would otherwise have been locally
borne. Local business leaders, with cooperation from local and state
officials, saw federal highway subsidies as a smart way to attract
growth and hence garnered local benefits with federal dollars. As
Foglesong notes, local and state officials did on occasion seek to reim
pose some balance in the Disney-government interactions, but with
little substantive effect. No actor reveals much interest in less
monetized amenities such as wetlands or thinks in advance about the
risks of overdependence on a low wage; tourist-based economy. The
often unexamined faith that state and local governments will be sensi
tive to local citizen concerns is repeatedly contradicted. State and local
officials have their own incentives and goals that, apart from a desire
for growth, appear only minimally linked to broader public concerns.52
A more optimistic assessment is that the Disney World story shows
that regulatory design, institutions, and incentives matter.53 The main
actors in this story again and again responded to legal and institutional
incentives. Social engineering through fiscal subsidies facilitated high
ways and infrastructure expenditures critical to Disney's meteoric
growth. Where regulation was lacking, such as in wetlands protection,
destruction followed. Disney's substantial long-term stake in Disney
World led it to invest substantial monetary, political and human capi
tal up front to lock in an advantaged position, long before local or
state officials were equally sophisticated. Even though Disney thereby
avoided many of the burdens of state regional growth laws, in the end
51. For an introduction to public choice theories, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991 ).
52. But see Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Interest Groups, and
Competence
(SSRN
Elec. Paper Coll. No. 293700, 2001),
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=293700 (analyzing substantial and prevalent wealth redis
tributing programs by local governments despite contrary predictions).

Judicial

53. For exploration of how attention to institutions and context is critical to legal analy
sis, see Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the Mi
croanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1 996).
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it was unable completely to bypass growth burdens and ultimately had
to surrender some of its legal immunities. This new law modified citi
zen, official and Disney expectations about what Disney should be ex
pected to do. By enacting this law, the state made Disney vulnerable
to bad publicity and Disney was forced to justify its unwillingness to
share growth burdens. Politics, individuals' efforts and regulatory in
centives changed the evolving Disney-government bargains. Foglesong
convinces the reader that government-private actor interactions will
evolve as circumstances change and institutional relationships mature,
but increasingly sophisticated and displeased officials still never quite
came to grips with Disney's power and influence.
CONCLUSION

Married to the Mouse offers an exemplary blend of historical re
search distilled to provide insights into the pervasively important ques
tion of how dominant businesses and government officials interact and
bargain. Disney was not given an eternal free pass from legal con
straints, but succeeded in securing a remarkable array of government
powers and breaks from government-imposed burdens. Most notably,
Disney remained consistently successful in avoiding the unpredictable
presence of citizen power and voice. Despite oft-voiced arguments
that state and local governments will be sensitive to local concerns and
citizen desires, Foglesong's analysis is not reassuring. This story calls
out for counter-stories. Are there other settings in which local and
state governments, confronted with powerful investor demands for
market and political power, have more firmly insisted on retention of
political accountability and citizen voice? How often are assumptions
of state and local sensitivity to citizen preferences borne out in reality?
What institutional arrangements lead state and local officials to pro
vide more balanced treatment of a dominant employer? Richard
Foglesong's superb book stands as a challenge to legal scholars to dig
past the surface of written law, to examine the implemented reality of
how dominant businesses and state and local governments interact.

